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I will present a status report on the OR1 assessment of 
the risk at Washington National Airport and the surrounding 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area associated with commercial 
operations of aircraft with graphite fiber composite in their 
structures. Figure 1 is an outline of my presentation. 
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First, I'd like to spend a minute discussing the overall 
strategy and the resulting need for individual airport analyses 
of the type we're going to describe. I shall then describe the 
actual model for assessing the risk to an airport and to the 
surrounding metropolitan area. Then, for that risk assessment 
model, I'd like to describe the set of submodels that comprise 
the overall model. Each one of the submodels will be described 
in terms of its three principal elements: the method that is 
used, the assumptions that are reauired in order to use that 
method, and the required data. Types, sources, and some examples 
of the data that are required as input to each model will be 
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presented. Finally, we'll present preliminary results based 
on those data, using the methods we will have described, for the 
Washington, D.C. - Washington National Airport risk analysis. 
The overall strategy for developing the national risk profile, 
that Dr. Credeur showed us in a hypothetical example earlier, 
is shown schematically in figure 2. The cycle in the middle 
tells us that we're still discussing among ourselves, and with the 
Project Officer and her associates, the appropriate methods to 
use for blending the risk profiles developed for individual 
airports. On the other hand, all the methods that we've discussed 
to date involve combining results for individual airports in 
order to develop the national risk profile. For this reason, we 
felt it was necessary to analyze at least one airport and develop 
methods that could be applied to any airport, given appropriate 
data for that locale. With that in mind, I would like to describe 
the model for the individual airport and, as I said earlier, we 
will blow that up in detail and describe all the subelements 
that comprise that model in terms of the methods used, assump- 
tions made, and the necessary input data. 
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The airport model involves the major steps shown on figure 3. 
We first have to decide what time frame we're interested in and 
how long a time period we want to simulate. For that period, we 
estimate the number of accidents at this airport. Then for each 
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accident simulated, we do something called "Process Accident", 
which involves computing the likelihood of damage to different 
facilities and estimating the resulting costs. We repeat that 
step for all the accidents in the time period we're modeling. We 
then generate more accidents for another time period and compute 
the statistics over all periods (or samples) to get the type of 
statistical distribution that Dr. Credeur showed us earlier. The 
statistical distribution is obtained, therefore, by the use of 
what is generally called a llMonte Carlo Simulation." What I'd 
like to do now is expand on the risk assessment model and discuss 
it in terms of its components. 
We will concentrate on the calculations we're doing for 1985 
as our time period or time frame. Let's discuss the first step 
beyond that one in the risk assessment model for a particular 
airport or area. It is necessary to start with an estimate of 
the expected number of accidents at an airport during the 
simulated time period. As indicated on figure 4, the method is 
to allocate a fraction of the national total accidents to the 
combination of aircraft category and airport. The fraction is 
the ratio of operations for that aircraft type - aircraft 
combination to operations for the total U.S. Incidentally, the 
format we're following in figures 4 and 5 is the one I'd like to 
use throughout: method, assumption, and the data that is used 
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ESTIMATE NUMBER OF 
ACCIDENTS IN SAMPLE 
TIME PERIOD 
METHOD: 
0 ESTIMATE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS FOR YEAR OF INTEREST 
0 FOR EACH A/C CATEGORY-AIRPORT, COMPUTE RATIO OF 
OPERATIONS TO TOTAL U.S. OPERATIONS 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 EXPECTED NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS IS PROPORTIONAL TO 
NUMBER OF OPERATIONS 
Figure 4 
DATA: 
l NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD: 
ESTIMATE 6 FIRE ACCIDENTS IN U.S. FOR 1985 
l FAA AIRPORT EMISSIONS DATA BASE/WASHINGTON NATIONAL 
AIRPORT OPERATIONS IN 1985: 
1. LARGE (DC-IO, LlOll, 747.. . ) 18,850 
2. MEDIUM (727, 757, 767, 70;, DC-8 . . .) 724,766 
3. SMALL (737, DC-9 . . . ) 60,284 
l FAA AVIATION FORECASTS FY 1978-l 989: 
TOTAL U.S. OPERATIONS 7 7,700,000 
Figure 5 
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as input to the calculation. Again the basic assumption in 
performing this calculation is that the number of accidents at a 
particular place is proportional to the number of operations. 
We've tested that relationship and it is quite good. In order to 
obtain the necessary data we have to go to the primary data source 
for aircraft accident data, we have to go to the primary data source 
Board. In this case we're interested in accidents involving fires 
in the 1985 time period. We've estimated, on the basis of 
historical data from the National Transportation Safety Board, 
that a reasonable number of accidents involving fires for 
commercial operations in 1985 in all the United States might be 
six. 
In order to allocate a fraction of those six accidents to 
Washington National Airport, we use additional information in a 
data base that OR1 developed and maintains under contract to FAA. 
These are the estimated number of operations of aircraft in the 
three size classes shown on figure 5. The actual aircraft 
designators shown with the three classes are meant to be indicative 
of aircraft in those size classes today - they are not necessarily 
the aircraft that will be operating at National Airport in 1985. 
In order to get the denominator - the total number of certificated 
air carrier operations, we use the official FAA aviation forecast: 
in 1985 there will be about 11,700,OOO certificated air carrier 
operations in the United States. 
The next major step in applying the risk assessment model to 
a particular airport is to perform a set of calculations that we 
call "Process Accident." Once we have an estimate of the number 
of accidents, we want to deal with them one by one, and in order to 
process the accident, we have several calculations to go through 
as indicated on figure 6. These are performed with considerable 
speed by a computer that we have programmed to do the job. In 
the present case the computer is an IBM 370/155. Fortunately 
for me, many of the steps in the complete calculation were 
discussed by previous speakers in considerable detail. Basically, 
as Dr. Credeur pointed out, we want to develop a statistical 
description of the risk, and to do that, we want to draw random 
samples from distributions of such things as the accident 
characteristics, including the operational phase during which the 
accident took place and the accident location. 
We then compute the exterior exposure downwind of the acci- 
dent for a series of representative locations. For each of these 
locations we've defined combinations of commercial, industrial, 
and residential units. For each point, we can then compute the 
interior exposure, the associated failures, and the cost of those 
failures. The computer then goesback,performs this routine 
for all the locations impacted by the accident, adds them up, 
and is then finished with the accident. It then goes back and 
looks at the next accident in this time period, finishes all 
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accidents in the time period, and then performs the next replica- 
tion of the time period (or the next sample). In order to 
explain this in more detail, I'm in effect going to blow up the 
"Process Accident" routine which is the computer program that's 
at the heart of the calculation. 
As indicated in figure 7, the first thing we have to do is to 
develop - by sampling from appropriate statistical distributions - 
information about the simulated accident. In order to develop 
the characteristics of the accident we're investigating, we 
sample from historical distributions that describe the location 
of accidents involving fires and the operational phase during 
which those accidents occurred. We calculate the fraction of 
the aircraft destroyed by fire from analyses of individual 
accidents in the NTSB files. The assumption without which the 
calculation should not proceed is that the aircraft accident data 
are statistically homogeneous -- put another way: we have to use 
aggregate data from all accidents recorded in recent history 
throughout the United States to prepare these distributions for 
the individual airport we're studying. Examples of the input 
data are shown on figure 8. The data comes from the National 
Transportation Safety Board files: annual accident summary 
reports, report of individual accidents, and finally, the actual 
docket for each accident. The numbers on figure 8 are examples 
of the data we need: the distribution of fire accidents over 
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ACCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
METHOD: 
0 SAMPLE FROM HISTORICAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR 
LOCATIONS, OP-PHASE 
0 FRACTION OF A/C DESTROYED BY FIRE ESTIMATED BY 
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL ACCIDENTS 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 ACCIDENT DETAIL DATA ARE HOMOGENEOUS 
0 U.S. AGGREGATE DATA CAN BE APPLIED TO INDIVIDUAL 
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Figure 7 
DATA: 
FROM NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD FILES 
AND ACCIDENT REPORTS 
a DISTRIBUTION OF 0% STATIC 
FIRE ACCIDENTS 0% TAXI 
20 % TAKE-OFF 
20% IN FLIGHT 
60% LANDING 
0 ESTIMATED FRACTION 0% STATIC 
OF A/C INVOLVED 0% TAXI 
IN FIRE 20 % TAKE-OFF 
30% IN FLIGHT 
50 % LANDING 
Figure 8 
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operational phase and then the estimated fraction of the aircraft 
involved in the fire for fire accidents occurring in the different 
operational phases for which data are tabulated. Our estimate - 
on the basis of an analysis of about five years' accidents in 
considerable detail - is that about 20 percent of the aircraft 
would be involved in a fire that results from a take-off 
accident; 30 percent for an in-flight accident: and 50 percent for 
a landing accident. A study by the Stanford Research Institute 
recently made available to us, covering a larger sample, is 
essentially in agreement. I want to point out that, although 
the numbers in the lower right of figure 8 add to one hundred 
percent, they do not have to. 
The other thing we have to know about the accident is the 
amount of fiber liberated which is given on figure 9. Again, the 
aircraft types are those defined jointly by ORI, NASA, and the 
airframe manufacturers. The amount of graphite in the structure 
is based on estimates that we've mutually agreed on. We ' ve 
shown on the right the amount of fiber in pounds that we estimate 
would be liberated in an accident for each aircraft category, 
for an accident in each operational phase. There are two other 
phases in which, on the basis of our analysis, we would not 
expect any fiber to be liberated because fire would not result 
from the accident, so we haven't shown those. The basic 
assumption here is that only 20 percent of the graphite involved 
in the accident is released in the form of the single fibers that 
FIBER LIBERATED PER 
ACCIDENT WITH FIRE - 1985 
(Pounds) 
AIC CATEGORY 
1. LARGE 
DC-IO, LlOll, 747 
2. MEDIUM 
727, 767, 767, 
707, DC-8 
3. SMALL 
737, DC-9 
GRAPHITE IN 
STRUCTURE 
1000 
300 
200 
T 
TAKE-OFF 
40 
12 
8 
OP-PHASE 
LANDING IN-FLIGHT 
60 
18 
12 
NOTE: ASSUMES 20% OF INVOLVED FIBER IS RELEASED 
Figure 9 
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the analysis is concerned with - as opposed to clumps. This is 
based on limited experimental data. 
The next step in the "Process Accident", program is to compute 
the downwind exposures at representative locations, and in order 
to do that, the computer has to know where those locations are. 
so, we've developed methods for defining. points that we want to 
look at in the geographical area. We define representative 
points for industrial, commercial, and residential centers for 
each city and county in the geographical area of interest. As 
indicated in figure 10, the basic assumption that we've made is 
that the industrial and residential units of the types we're 
interested in are distributed relatively uniformly over the sub- 
area that's represented by a particular point. The kinds of data 
we need include population, for which we use the 1970 census. 
For business types, sizes, and locations, we take advantage of a 
scheme developed primarily by the Department of Commerce and used 
by many agencies: namely, the SIC (Standard Industrial Classifi- 
cation) code, We!ve limited ourselves to what is called the two- 
digit breakdown, some examples of which are shown at the bottom of 
figure 11. For example, SIC code 23 covers places that manufac- 
ture apparel and do other textile processing. Number 27 is in 
the manufacturing category for printing and publishing. 54 is the 
code number in the retail business group comprising food stores. 
SIC 60 is banking. Number 62 is stock brokers and so on. The 
DEFINE REPRESENTATIVE 
LOCATIONS 
METHOD: 
0 DEFINE INDUSTRY AND RESIDENCE CENTERS FOR EACH 
CITY, COUNTY 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 INDUSTRIAL UNITS AND RESIDENCES UNIFORMLY 
DISTRIBUTED OVER SUB AREAS 
Figure 10 
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DATA: 
l POPULATION - 7970 CENSUS 
0 BUSINESS TYPES, NUMBERS, PAYROLL BY 2-DIGIT SIC* 
CODE - COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 
0 BUSINESS LOCATIONS - LOCAL & STATE DEVELOPMENT 
AGENCIES 
*SIC = STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
eg: 23, MANUFACTURING APPAREL 
27, PRINTING & PUBLISHING 
54, FOOD STORES 
60, BANKING 
Figure 11 
County Business Patterns identifies the kinds of business per- 
formed in an individual county using this terminology. It tells 
us how many employees there are; there's a frequency distribution 
of establishments by size, as well as payroll data. 
In order to determine where clusters of these businesses are 
on a scale finer than the county, we deal with people at state 
and local economic development agencies. An example of the kind 
of thing we've done is illustrated on figure 12. The scale on 
figure 12 indicates that Howard County, at its closest point, is 
15 or 20 miles from National Airport. The inset map in the lower 
left of figure 12 shows Howard County in more detail. In order 
for us to represent Howard County for the calculation of graphite 
fiber impact, we've located a point at Ellicott City which is 
residential: we have located another point at Columbia, 
Maryland - a so-called new town - as a center of residences and 
commercial interests, primarily retail establishments. The area 
marked by four heavy dashed lines is the part of Howard County 
zoned for industry. The heavy dot is where we have placed all 
the significant industry in Howard County and essentially 
assumed that the part of Howard County to the left (west) of those 
three points is essentially farm land and not of great interest 
to us from the risk-assessment point of view. The same 
methodology has been applied to Washington, D.C., and the 
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~ 
b lb 
Washington National Airport l 
Commercial and Residential 
f m--2 2-r 1 INDUSTRIAL SITES 
‘-wJ ’ Industrial 
Figure 12 
Maryland and Virginia countryside within about 50 miles of 
Washington National Airport to define the set of representative 
locations for which the computer program called "Process 
Accident" will calculate exterior exposures. 
Once we've generated an accident with its characteristics - 
"drawn an accident" is the customary expression - we proceed as 
indicated in figure 13 to compute the downwind concentrations 
and the associated exposure at the set of points we're interested 
in. In order to do that, we use a technique similar to the 
turn of the roulette wheel that Dr. Credeur talked about to draw 
a set of weather variables from a distribution that gives the 
observed frequency with which different combinations of wind 
speed, direction, and stability categories occurred in the past. 
These data are made available by the National Climatic Center 
for major weather stations around the country--so we use the 
data set for Washington National Airport. This process gives 
us the weather conditions for the accident we are now processing. 
We calculate the pertinent plume rise characteristics using the 
so-called Briggs model that was described for us by Dr. Wolf 
Elber yesterday. The energy release rate is a function of the 
aircraft category. The assumption is that the size of the burning 
fuel pool, and thus the heat release rate, is proportional to the 
square of the wing span of the aircraft. The computer program 
uses inputs to the Briggs calculation based on the size of 
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COMPUTE DOWNWIND 
CONCENTRATION 
METHOD: 
0 RANDOM DRAW OF WEATHER CONDITIONS 
0 FIRE PLUME BASED ON BRIGGS MODEL - ENERGY RELEASE 
RATE A FUNCTION OF A/C CATEGORY 
0 DOWNWIND TRANSPORT - GAUSSIAN MODEL 
0 DISPERSION, LAYER DEPTH FUNCTIONS OF STABILITY 
CLASS 
0 PARTICLES FALL OUT 
0 PARTIAL REFLECTION AT SURFACE 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 FIBER RELEASED = FRACTION OF A/C DESTROYED BY 
FIRE X 0.2 
0 FIBERS MOVE WITH MEAN WIND 
0 DISPERSION IN VERTICAL AND LATERAL DIRECTIONS 
Figure 13 
typical aircraft in each category involved in the simulated 
accident. 
The subsequent downwind transport calculation is based on a 
Gaussian model. The dispersion parameters that go into that 
calculation are based on a set of inputs from EPA. As shown on 
figure 14, they are from the CRSTER model that EPA makes available. 
The inversion height - or layer depth - is from a publication by 
George Holzworth. He has essentially developed a climatology 
of mixing depths or inversion heights and associated wind speeds 
for different stability classes. The model we use then takes 
account of dispersion, allows the particles to fall to the 
surface, and allows for partial reflection of the fibers at 
the surface and for reflection at the inversion. The basic 
assumption we've made is that the fraction of aircraft destroyed 
in the fire is used as an estimate of the fraction of the amount 
of fibers in the aircraft released. To be more precise, the 
amount of fiber released is set equal to the fraction of aircraft 
consumed by fire, which we have estimated from accident data, 
times the factor 0.2 to represent that part of the graphite 
that will end up as single fibers. The fibers move downwind 
with the mean wind, spreading by dispersion only in the vertical 
and lateral directions. These latter are standard assumptions 
in most of the Gaussian plume models used in pollution studies. 
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DATA: 
. WIND SPEED, DIRECTION, STABILITY CLASS FROM 
NATIONAL CLIMATIC CENTER 
. DISPERSION - “CRSTER” MODEL FROM EPA/MODIFIED 
0 LAYER DEPTH - HOLZWORTH, MIXING HEIGHTS, WIND 
SPEED. . . EPA, 1972 
Figure 14 
The particle fall rate is represented by using a "tilted" plume 
model, which is a variation of the basic Gaussian model. 
Having computed the exterior concentration and the resulting 
exposure at our representative locations, the next step, as 
indicated in figure 15, is to compute interior exposures for the 
places we're interested in. To do that, we assumed that - for 
each one of the two-digit SIC codes - we can define a representa- 
tive building. For each representative building type we defined 
ventilation parameters. As indicated on figure 16, the data 
source for most of this work is a volume put out by the Carrier 
Corporation for the design of air conditioning systems. That 
was the basic source of information for air leakage into 
buildings. The calculation proceeds along the lines that Mr. 
Israel Taback described. 
For the particular building parameters we've assigned to 
each business and industrial category, we compute an interior 
exposure which is a function of the external exposure, the 
ventilation parameters, as well as the wind speed, and the fall 
rate of the particles. The basic assumption here is that these 
typical facilities can be defined and that all facilities 
associated with a given type of business or industry are similar. 
I should mention that, in addition to the Carrier Corporation's 
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COMPUTE INTERIOR EXPOSURE 
METHOD: 
0 FOR EACH INDUSTRY CLASS, DEFINE VENTILATION 
PARAMETERS FOR TYPICAL FACILITY 
0 COMPUTE INTERIOR EXPOSURE FROM EXTERIOR EXPOSURE, 
BUILDING PARAMETERS, WiND SPEED, PARTICLE FALL RATE 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 TYPICAL ENCLOSURES CAN BE DEFINED 
Figure 15 
DATA: 
. CARRIER CORPORATION 
HANDBOOK OF AIRCONDITIONING 
SYSTEM DESIGN 1965 
0 SITE VISITS 
Figure 16 
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handbook, we made quite a few site visits in the Washington 
metropolitan area. They were listed on one of the slides that 
Mr. Ansel Butterfield used yesterday in his talk on "Pathfinder 
Surveys.U 
At this point, we have simulated an accident, computed the 
downwind exterior exposure, and moved the fibers inside typical 
facilities at representative locations. We now need to estimate 
the expected failures. As indicated on figure 17, the basic 
method is to define typical systems for each of the two-digit 
COMPUTE FAILURES 
METHOD: 
0 DEFINE TYPICAL SYSTEMS FOR EACH INDUSTRIAL 
CLASS, RESIDENCE 
0 COMPUTE OVERALL FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR EACH 
TYPICAL FACILITY USING INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT 
FAILURE PROBABILITY, COMPUTED EXPOSURE 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 TYPICAL SYSTEMS CAN BE DEFINED 
0 EXPONENTIAL FAILURE MODEL FOR INDIVIDUAL 
EQUIPMENTS 
Figure 17 
industrial-commercial SIC categories that are present in 
Washington, D.C. and environs. For each of these systems, we 
computed an overall failure probability. Figure 18 illustrates 
the kind of data we used. As a result of digging into the 
journals and reports listed, we were able to develop a model of 
the type shown for all the industries and businesses we were 
concerned with. It says that, typically, power comes in from the 
outside through a transformer, passes through a switch panel and/or 
terminals on the transformer, and flows to something we call common 
equipment, computers or control systems for the entire facility. 
Power is then split into a set of parallel lines, each of which 
might involve a servo and a control system. 
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DATA: 
FACILITY MODELS FROM 
IEEE SPECTRUM 
INSTRUMENT & CONTROL SYSTEMS 
AUTOMATION/INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 
MACHINE DESIGN 
STANDARD HANDBOOK OF MECH. ENG. 
CONTROL ENGINEERS HANDBOOK 
SITE VISITS 
DISTRIBUTED/ 
PARALLEL LINES 
I I 
--y SERVO CONTROL 
COMMON 
POWER IN 
SWITCH EQUIPMENT: 
b GEAR 4 COMPUTER, -+ SERVO 
CONTROL 
+ SERVO 
CONTROL 
CONTROL 
-; 
r FROM TEST DATA PF = I--e 
COLOR TV: 10’ FIBER-SECONDS/m3 
COMPUTER: IO6 
HIFI AMP: lo5 
Figure 18 
The probability of failure for each individual element in 
the system obeys an exponential law. As shown on_ figure 18 the 
probability of failure is 1 - exp(-E/E), where E is a number we 
get from test data of the type described by Mr. Taback in his lec- 
ture on vulnerability. From the available experimental data we 
matched the tested equipment to actual industrial and commercial 
equipment as closely as possible to obtain the appropriate 72. With 
the computed interior exposures E, and E, we compute the failure 
probabilities for individual equipment. With these individual 
probabilities properly hooked together, we obtain - for the com- 
puted interior exposure - an estimate of the probability that a 
plant or facility of a particular industrial-commercial category 
will fail. A basic assumption is that such typical systems can 
indeed be defined and that the exponential failure model is appro- 
priate for the individual equipment. Once we've computed these 
expected failures, we have to estimate the cost impact. That is 
the next step in our "Process Accident" calculation. 
To compute the costs of failures, the basic method, as 
indicated on figure 19, considers that the fraction of the 
industry down or the fraction of production lost is equal to the 
probability that an industrial unit of that class has failed. 
The residential unit cost is estimated by looking at the costs of 
repairing equipment in the household that has failed. The data 
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COST OUT FAILURES 
METHOD: 
0 FRACTION OF INDUSTRY DOWN = PROBABILITY OF 
INDUSTRIAL UNIT FAILING 
0 COST OF OUTAGE IS FRACTION OF LOCAL GDP, BY SIC 
0 RESIDENTIAL UNIT COST IS COST OF REPAIRING FAILED 
EQUIPMENTS 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 INDUSTRIAL IMPACT MEASURABLE BY GDP 
0 NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY VALUES CAN BE APPLIED 
LOCALLY 
Figure 19 
and the actual formula or algorithm for industrial cost estimating 
are shown on figure 20. It says that for a particular SIC 
classification, we can estimate local productivity by looking at 
the Gross Domestic Product (a term that is closely related to what 
everyone calls the GNP (Gross National Product, the sum of all 
goods and services produced in a year)). 
The Gross Domestic Product is the Gross National Product 
with all production in the United States by foreign manufacturers 
added and all production by American manufacturers overseas 
taken away. The basic approach is to say that the productivity 
per payroll dollar can be estimated by looking at the amount of 
Gross Domestic Product assigned to each economic sector on the 
national level. We take the Gross Domestic Product associated 
with each type of industry and divide it by the national payroll 
for the same type of industry - that, in effect, gives us the impact 
of a payroll dollar on Gross Domestic Product. We then multiply 
that result by the local payroll for the same industrial category 
obtained from a document called County Business Patterns for each 
county (as opposed to the County Business Patterns, National -__ 
Summary.) We then multiply that result by the probability of 
failure for that class of industry that we just computed at the 
particular location. We have assumed that the impact lasts one 
day - so we have divided the annual GDP by 365 in estimating fail- 
ure impacts. We add these costs up over all SIC categories - all 
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DATA: 
COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 
INDUSTRIAL COST =6 PF, SIC 
(LOCAL PAY ROLL)SIC 
COUNTY B”S,NESS P;::~;;;;;fp’s’c 
NA TIONA L SUMMARY 
. 
Figure 20 
industries or kinds of commerce represented at this location. 
That is the way we estimate the industrial and commercial impact 
of a failure at the local lev.el. 
The basic assumption is that industrial impact can be 
measured this way and that the national productivity estimate 
obtained by dividing Gross Domestic Product by the national 
payroll for a particular industrial sector can be applied locally. 
In other words, it says that the workers, say in printing or 
publishing at Time-Life Books in Alexandria, are as efficient as 
the "national average workers" in the same industry. 
The next calculation, as indicated on figure 21, is to estimate 
the impact on individual households. Again, as described by Mr. 
Taback yesterday, we have estimated some fraction of households 
as being air-conditioned, some not air-conditioned, where the 
fraction that is air-conditioned decreases with distance away 
from the metropolitan area - assuming that farmers in Talbott 
County do not have air-conditioned farmhouses. We assume, on the 
other hand, that everybody in Montgomery County is air-conditioned. 
We've estimated the number of TV's and Hi-Fi's per household, 
again assuming that although the national average is one TV per 
household, the number will be a little higher in more affluent 
communities and lower in less affluent communities. With those 
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HOUSEHOLD COST MODEL 
METHOD: 
0 VENTILATION PARAMETERS DEFINED FOR A-C, NON A-C 
HOUSEHOLDS 
0 ESTIMATE NUMBERS OF TVs, HlFls PER HOUSEHOLD FOR 
EACH GEOGRAPHICAL AREA 
0 COMPUTE NUMBER OF TV, HIFI FAILURES EACH AREA 
0 COMPUTE TOTAL REPAIR COSTS 
ASSUMPTION: 
0 HOUSEHOLDS UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED OVER 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 
Figure 21 
numbers we were able to compute the estimated number of TV and 
Hi-Fi failures for each one of our residential units. We 
estimated the total repair costs based on a gross cut: it costs 
50 dollars to fix a TV set and $75 for a Hi-Fi, if it failed as 
a result of the graphite fiber problem. Again, the basic 
assumption is that the households are uniformly distributed in 
the neighborhood of the representative points we've selected. 
We find that we have now more or less worked our way 
painstakingly through the calculation. The next step is one that 
doesn't need any technical explanation - we add up the costs for 
everything at each location and then add up the costs for all 
locations for this accident. 
That takes us through the "Process Accident" routine, and if 
we look back at the Airport-Metropolitan Area model we find that 
once we have finished the "Process Accident" routine we repeat 
it for every accident in the simulated time period. We then 
repeat the time period over and over again to develop statistics 
over many sample time periods. I feel that I have now described 
the strategy - why we need the individual airport results - and I 
have described the Airport-Metropolitan Area model in some detail. 
I would like to stick to our original outline and show you several 
preliminary results for the Washington National Airport - 
Washington Metropolitan Area risk assessment. The map we looked 
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at (figure 12) showed that the area we needed to consider 
included the Baltimore SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area), the Washington, D.C., SMSA, and the Wilmington, Delaware, 
SMSA. So, when we say Washington, D.C., we're really talking 
about Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Frederick, Maryland, as 
well as large parts of Virginia. 
We are still working on the processing of the statistics to 
develop risk profiles. Figure 22 shows some sample results 
garnered from the simulation of 2,000 accidents processed by the 
computer in exactly the way I described. Over the 2000 
accidents - using the best estimates we could get for our 1985 
scenario - preliminary results indicate that expected cost, or 
average cost per accident, is on the order of 5,000 dollars. If 
one looks at the accident rate and asks for the numbers per year - 
the expected cost per yearron the order of a little more than 
100 dollars; because, the likelihood of an accident at the 
Washington National Airport involving fire in an aircraft with 
graphite fiber is quite small. If you remember, we started off 
with an estimate of 6 fire accidents per year in the country and 
that number is then degraded by the share of operations at 
Washington National Airport, further degraded by the fact that 
about 20 percent of the 1985 aircraft fleet will be using graphite 
fiber. We can also look at the distribution of accidents. We've 
estimated that - at the relatively high end of the spectrum - .005, 
1985 RESULTS 
2000 SIMULATED ACCIDENTS 
l EXPECTED COST PER ACCIDENT = $5000 
l EXPECTED COST PER YEAR = $110 
l FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS WITH COSTS> $200,000 = 0.005 
CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACCIDENTS: 
STABLE ATMOSPHERE PLUME STOPS 
LOW WIND SPEED AT INVERSION 
NIGHTTIME OPS 
Figure 22 
192 
or half a percent, of the 2,000 accidents we simulated ran up 
costs greater than 200,000 dollars. 
Now, I'd like to describe one of the advantages of our method. 
Although Dr. Credeur concentrated on statistics in her talk and 
our goal is clearly to develop statistical results, one has the 
option when using this computer program of asking for what I call 
almost "infinite detail." We have several options with regard 
to computer output, starting with the "De-Bug Print" which prints 
out every calculation the computer made-- all the way up to gross 
statistics summarized over many replications. In between, we 
can ask for certain results for every accident that was simulated 
in the program. 
What we've done in figure 23 for the 1985 scenario is to show 
key items that the computer drew from the random distributions 
described earlier - associated with the results computed for each 
accident. Of interest is the fact that all of these relatively 
high cost accidents, in our sample of 2,000, occurred in the 
most stable meteorological conditions. All but one of the 
accidents took place in the landing phase. The stability 
conditions correspond to what Dr. Elber defined as Class E and 
Class F, the most stable Pasquill-Gifford categories. Associated 
with them were low wind speeds, but different wind directions. A 
sample from the statistics for the Washington National Airport 
shows that all directions are not equally likely, but these 
HIGHEST COST ACCIDENTS 
1985: BASE CASE 
WIND GRAPHITE TOTAL 
AIRCRAFT OP STAB RELEASED COST 
CATEGORY PHASE CLASS SPEED 
(M/SEC) 
DIR. (POUNDS) ($103) 
MED LAND 6 2 166” 30 644 
LARGE LAND 5 2 226 100 537 
MED LAND 6 2 174 30 490 
MED LAND 5 2 171 30 367 
MED LAND 6 2 341 30 303 
SMALL TAKE-OFF 6 2 165 80 299 
MED LAND 6 2 177 30 250 
MED LAND 6 2 169 30 250 
MED LAND 5 2 342 30 234 
MED LAND 6 2 162 30 227 
Figure 23 
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are the directions associated with these particular accidents. 
These stable meteorological conditions, incidentally, miqht occur 
with fog or generally reduced visibility. Further, the stable 
atmosphere and low wind speeds are typical of nighttime 
conditions. This implies - again, this is a preliminary result 
based on the analysis of these 2,000 simulated accidents - that if 
a relatively bad accident of this type were to occur it would 
appear most likely to occur during nighttime operations. Now, 
for safety purposes, night ends an hour after sunrise and 
begins an hour before sunset. So even though a commercial airport 
typically closes at night, closing time might be ten or eleven 
PM, which includes a few hours of what Pasquill-Gifford call 
nighttime. In addition, in these cases the Briggs model is used 
to estimate the height of the fire plume, and if the plume height 
provided by the equation is above the inversion, we stop it at 
the inversion. This is by far the most frequently observed 
situation. We've shown that, when the amount of fibers increases 
by a factor of 10, the expected cost per accident increases by 
a little less than a factor of 10. So that, if the estimated 
costs for other scenarios are high enough to worry about, these 
results say that we should probably take a closer look at the 
meteorology of this situation. 
Now beyond these results, we have made some runs for the 
1993 time frame using the information shown on figure 24. For 
1993 SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
FRACTION 
AIRCRAFT WITH GRAPHITE AIRPORT 
CATEGORY GRAPHITE PER A/C OPS 
1 .33 1000 18,850 
2 .20 300 124,766 
TOTAL U.S. OPS 
11,700,000 
7 
3 .20 200 60,284 
1 .50 4500 29,621* 
rn’ 
% 2 .60 1500 143,669 * 
TOTAL U.S. OPS 
13,800,000* 
F 
3 .50 1000 24,710 * 
* 1995 FAA PROJECTIONS 
Figure 24 
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1993, the rough situation is that the amount of composite per 
aircraft with composite structure is expected to increase by 
about a factor of 5. The number of aircraft with composite in 
their structures is expected to go up roughly by a factor of 2 
to 3. The charts identify the time frame as 1993 although the 
FAA air traffic projections are for 1995, the closest date for 
which they are available. With those changes to the basic 
inputs, the results for 1993 are as shown on figure 25. Assuming 
that population and industry stay the same, the average cost 
associated with these accidents on a per-year basis is estimated 
to be about a thousand dollars and the average cost per accident, 
on the order of $20,000. This is based on an analysis of about 
2,500 simulated accidents. Using the same $200,000 dollar cutoff 
we used for the 1985 scenario, it is estimated that about 2 
percent of the accidents involving fires aboard aircraft with 
graphite fibers in their structures would incur costs greater 
than $200,000. 
1993 RESULTS 
a 
0 
a 
0 
0 
2500 SIMULATED ACCIDENTS 
EXPECTED COST PER ACCIDENT2 $20,000 
EXPECTED COST PER YEAR--$1 000 
FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS WITH 
COSTS> $200,000 = 0.02 
FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS WITH 
COSTS > $1 ,OOO,OOO = .0036 
ONE ACCIDENT WITH COST > $4,000,000 
Figure 25 
To wind things up, I would like to summarize our current 
status, which is shown on figure 26. We have developed a viable 
airport risk assessment model. In the lingo of computer experts, 
it is an input-driven model. We have some preliminary results 
for the Washington National Airport risk for 1985 and 1993. We 
plan to combine those results appropriately to develop risk 
profiles for the Washington National Airport and Washington- 
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CONCLUSIONS 
STATUS REPORT 
l AIRPORT RISK ASSESSMENT 
MODEL DEVELOPED 
l PRELiMlNARY RESULTS PRESENTED 
FOR WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT 
FUTURE 
l RISK PROFILE TO BE 
CALCULATED 
l NATIONAL RISK TO BE 
ESTIMATED 
Figure 26 
Baltimore metropolitan area and to go on from that to develop a 
national risk estimate. That completes the formal presentation. 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Do you have the standard deviation for the accident 
costs as well as the expected value? 
I don't have that right now. We haven't calculated it 
yet. 
When you talk about 6,airplanes a year being involved 
in fire, you projected that for 1985 . . Is that 6 
airplanes with composite fibers? 
No, six altogether. For fire accidents with composite 
onboard, it's actually lower than that. It's about 
20 percent of that number (6). 
All your results are for stable meteorological 
conditions? 
Well, I'm sorry if you drew that conclusion, because 
that means I really didn't get my message across very 
well. The major point of our whole approach has been 
the sampling of conditions from the appropriate statis- 
tical distributions The meteorology is drawn from a dis- 
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tribution that gives wind speed, wind direction, and 
stability class for Washington National Airport. The 
likelihood that the stability for the particular 
accident will be an unstable case is based on the 
historical record of weather as observed at National 
Airport over a long period of time. 
The cases on the last figure were the conditions 
associated with the ten worst accidents out of 2,000, 
so it happened that the highest cost accidents 
according to the model we've developed seem to be those 
that occurred when stable conditions existed. 
We ran 2,000 accidents for 1985. Each time there's an 
accident the computer asks: "What's the weather for 
this accident?" It looks at a table, structured by 
sixteen wind directions, five wind speed ranges, and 
six stability classes, so there's a box for every 
one of those combinations. In each box is the fraction 
of weather observations at Washington National 
Airport in which that combination was observed. Now 
the computer makes a random draw, generates a random 
number, turns the roulette wheel that Dr. Credeur 
told us about, and picks the weather condition. 
Question: (Continues) But we know that accidents tend to occur 
when the weather is bad. 
Answer: Well, that's a problem that we recognized early in the 
game and addressed with the Project Officer. A 
decision was made to draw the weather from this random 
distribution. Now, it's true that one would have 
expected some bias in accidents toward bad weather, 
likewise towards cases when there's rain falling. 
Frankly, for the degree of precision with which we 
know all the inputs that go into this calculation I 
feel that that problem is one that we can neglect for 
the time being. 
Dr. Credeur responds: Your point is correct with respect to foul 
weather. Roughly 40 percent of the accidents that 
involve fire occur in foul weather; that is, weather 
involving precipitation. There are two problems 
with that though. "What is the effect of weather 
downstream?" You may have rain at an accident site 
for a very short time or over only a very small por- 
tion of the dispersion area. So one of the problems 
was how to handle the rain factor. The other was that, 
even if we incorporate it, the greatest impact it 
would have upon the answer was at most a factor of 2. 
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The other errors involved in this problem are much 
greater than that, so for the time being, we're not 
including it. 
Question: Can you report on the results of sensitivity analyses? 
Answer: Well, let's put it this way. One of the reasons we 
developed this approach was to be able to do the kind 
of things you asked about. We haven't done them yet. 
The one thing we can say is that the average cost per 
accident, at least in the range we're dealing with, 
is roughly linear with the amount of composite. 
Increase the amount of composite per aircraft by a 
factor of 10 and the average cost goes up by a little 
less than a factor of 10. 
Question: What about sensitivity of results to the modeling 
method itself? 
Answer: Well, hopefully, we're going to get some of that by 
comparing results from people who've used other models 
for the same kind of calculation. One of the big 
things that our industrial impact calculation leaves 
out is the cost of repair of equipment that may fail. 
In making the decision to use this approach - which I 
must admit is very attractive on the basis of data 
availability - we argued that the cost of a plant 
being closed down might roughly be equal to the cost 
of cleaning up any equipment. At most we thought we 
might be off by a factor of 2. We've made the 
assumption here that if a plant is down, it's down for 
a day. There's a one over 365 factor applied to the 
GNP numbers. That's our intuitive feel for that part 
of the problem. 
Question: Have you neglected costs due to lawsuits following - 
accidents? 
Answer: The honest answer to that is: yesI we are neglecting 
that part of the problem. 
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